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Abstract
We describe an illusion in which a stranger’s voice, when presented as the auditory concomitant of a participant’s own
speech, is perceived as a modified version of their own voice. When the congruence between utterance and feedback
breaks down, the illusion is also broken. Compared to a baseline condition in which participants heard their own voice as
feedback, hearing a stranger’s voice induced robust changes in the fundamental frequency (F0) of their production.
Moreover, the shift in F0 appears to be feedback dependent, since shift patterns depended reliably on the relationship
between the participant’s own F0 and the stranger-voice F0. The shift in F0 was evident both when the illusion was present
and after it was broken, suggesting that auditory feedback from production may be used separately for self-recognition and
for vocal motor control. Our findings indicate that self-recognition of voices, like other body attributes, is malleable and
context dependent.
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Introduction
The rubber hand illusion describes a phenomenon where
temporally coincident visual and somatosensory inputs (i.e., the
feeling of someone stroking the fingers of your own hidden hand,
and the sight of a prosthetic hand being stroked the same way)
combine to create the perception of body ownership, a critical
component of self-awareness [1], [2]. Similar perceptual illusions
have also been demonstrated with respect to the face [3], and the
whole body [4]. It has been argued that self-attribution of body
parts is mediated by multisensory perceptual correlations [1], [5],
[6]. This means that the illusion itself is not modality specific and
similar phenomena might be observed across other modalities, as
long as multi-modal cues are converging.
Behavioral studies have documented illusory self-attribution
during voluntary action when action-related sensory cues were
manipulated to be coherent and congruent [7–9]. For example,
Van den Bos & Jeannerod [9] demonstrated that when an
experimenter’s hand was the only visual information presented to
the participants and when that experimenter performed, in
synchrony, the same finger movements as the participants did,
participants tended to identify the experimenter’s hand as their
own hand. This series of studies can be taken as evidence that
motor information provided during action can modulate the
perception of body ownership when the motor movement and its
sensory consequences are consistent [10].
Although there is a growing literature on the perception of body
ownership, empirical evidence regarding the perception of voice
ownership as a result of vocal motor output is lacking. Vocal
production provides rich sensory feedback signals (i.e., auditory
and somatosensory) which, together with representations generat-
ed during articulation, can contribute to the recognition of one’s
own voice through a self-monitoring system [11], [12]. Previous
studies have shown that psychotic patients with positive symptoms
of auditory hallucinations and delusions of control have difficulty
identifying self-produced sounds, and this appears to be due to an
impaired self-monitoring system [13–15]. However, it remains
unclear how normal individuals, in whom the self-monitoring
system is intact, would perceive the identity of an external voice
that is heard as concomitant auditory feedback of their own
vocalizations.
An important aspect of auditory feedback during vocal
production is that it is used for vocal motor control of ongoing
speech (e.g., [16]). Based on online feedback perturbation
paradigms, a number of studies have either provided behavioral
[17–19] or neuroimaging [20–23] evidence for the role of auditory
feedback in articulatory control, as part of an error correction
mechanism. The question that remains to be addressed here,
however, is whether auditory feedback is used the same way for
vocal motor control as for the recognition of one’s own voice.
To address these issues, we examined, both subjectively and
objectively, how normal participants responded to a feedback
voice that was heard as the auditory concomitant of their own
vocalizations. Specifically, participants produced one of two target
words on each trial, and heard auditory feedback temporally gated
with their own utterances using a real-time signal processing
system. We assessed participants’ subjective perception of, and
vocal-motor adaptation to, online auditory feedback of a) their
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production. We were interested in exploring how participants
would perceive the stranger voice feedback both when it was
congruent with their own production and when it was not, as well
as how participants’ subjective perception of voice identity was
related to the acoustics of their vocal production.
Method
Participants
Ninety-three right-handed female participants (age range: 18–
28 years, mean: 22 years) recruited from the Queen’s community
participated in this study. Participants were without any history of
neurological or hearing impairment, and spoke English as their
first language. Written informed consent was obtained from all
human participants. All procedures were cleared by the Queen’s
General Research Ethics Board.
Materials
Two female speakers of southern Ontario English were
recruited as stimulus voices (V1 and V2). Prior to the experiment,
utterances of the target words, ‘day’ and ‘too’, from these two
stimulus voices were recorded in a soundproof booth. The two
target words were selected because they are one-syllable English
words of consonant-vowel (CV) form. A pilot study demonstrated
that temporal aspects of production are similar across talkers.
Utterances of two additional words, ‘page’ and ‘test’, were also
recorded. The individuals recruited as stimulus voices were chosen
because the pitch of their voices was either higher (V1) or lower
(V2) than that of an average female talker of southern Ontario
English. MacDonald et al. [24] reported that for the vowels/e/
and/u/, the F0 of an average female talker was 204 and 213 Hz,
respectively. For the utterances used in this study, V1 had an F0 of
226 and 241 Hz for/e/and/u/respectively; V2 had an F0 of 187
and 200 Hz for/e/and/u/.
Procedure
Testing took place in a soundproof booth with a microphone
(Sennheiser E845S, Sennheiser Electronic, Germany) and a set of
headphones (Sennheiser HD265 Linear, Sennheiser Electronic,
Germany) connected through a Fireface 400 audio interface
(RME, Germany) to a real-time signal processing computer
(National Instruments, TX), on which a deterministic signal
processing program was implemented [25], [26]. This real-time
system is capable of delivering auditory stimuli, either pre-
recorded or relayed directly from the microphone, through the
headphones without noticeable delay (iteration delay less than
10 ms) from the onset of speech production. In the cases when
participants’ utterances were shorter than the recorded stimulus
voice utterances, our system would match the offset of their
vocalizations by truncating the recorded utterances after produc-
tion ceased.
The experiment consisted of 155 trials. On each trial,
participants were prompted to speak either ‘day’ or ‘too’ into
the microphone and heard concomitant auditory feedback
through the headphones. Low-level white noise was present in
the headphones to minimize the bone-conducted speech feedback
while they vocalized [27]. Performance on each trial was
monitored by the experimenter (ZZZ) from outside the booth
and also recorded by our system. Over the 155 trials, 80 trials of
‘day’ and 75 trials of ‘too’ were presented in the same
pseudorandom order for each participant, such that no more
than three consecutive trials of the same word occurred.
a) Experimental paradigm and groups (Early Mismatch
and Late Mismatch). The experiment consisted of 4 stages:
Baseline, Stimulus Voice Match, Stimulus Voice Mismatch, and
Post Mismatch (see Figure 1). During the Baseline stage,
participants produced 20 utterances of the target words while
receiving their own unaltered feedback. During the three other
stages, when participants produced a target word, they heard one
of the utterances produced by a stimulus voice (V1 or V2). This
feedback matched the produced word in the Match and Post
Mismatch stages, but differed in the Mismatch stage where
participants produced ‘day’ or ‘too’ but heard the stimulus voice
saying ‘page’ or ‘test’.
Participants were randomly assigned into one of two experi-
mental groups (Early Mismatch and Late Mismatch) that differed
in when the Mismatch stage occurred. The Match stage consisted
of 45 trials (Early Mismatch) or 110 trials (Late Mismatch). The
Mismatch stage occurred at trials 66–70 (Early Mismatch) or trials
131–135 (Late Mismatch). The final stage, Post Mismatch, was
similar to the Match stage, but consisted of 20 and 85 trials for the
Late- and Early Mismatch groups respectively.
b) Subjective report. At five time points over the course of
the experiment (see Figure 1), participants responded to two
questions concerning the perceived identity of the feedback voice
using a 7-point Likert scale in the form of a sliding pointer on the
computer screen (with 1 indicating ‘‘strongly disagree’’ and 7
indicating ‘‘strongly agree’’). The two questions were adapted from
the rubber voice illusion questionnaire [1]: 1) ‘‘It felt as if the voice
I heard was my voice’’, and 2) ‘‘It felt as if the voice I heard was a
modified version of my voice’’. For the Early Mismatch group,
these questions were asked once before and four times after the
Mismatch stage, whereas for the Late Mismatch group, they were
asked four times before and once after the Mismatch stage.
Responses were measured to the nearest 0.1 units.
To test the validity of our questions, five participants had their
own voice utterances recorded during the Baseline stage. These
own utterances were then used as stimulus voice feedback during
the remaining 135 trials of the experiment (i.e., feedback always
temporally gated and congruent with vocalizations). As expected,
these participants rated both Q1 and Q2 high across the five time
points (see Figure 2). This suggests that these two question items
are not mutually exclusive.
However, a trivial reason for people reporting that the stimulus
voice was like their own voice would be that they could not
distinguish between the two. We examined this in a separate group
of 10 participants tested in a pilot version of the procedure
reported here. After the procedure, their ability to distinguish their
own recorded productions of five monosyllabic words (including
‘day’ and ‘too’) from those of the stimulus voice was tested on 20
trials. In each trial, one monosyllabic word was presented twice;
once in their voice and once in the stimulus voice. They were
asked to report the interval in which their own voice was
presented. Participants in this study were all able to distinguish
their own voices from the stimulus voice with 100% accuracy. This
result indicates that any perceptual effects in our study cannot be
due simply to the inability of our participants to distinguish
between their own and the stimulus voice.
c) Vocal production data analysis. We extracted the
fundamental frequency (F0) across the 155 trials for each
participant in order to track the acoustics of produced vowels
(see [25], [26]). The F0 track for every trial from each participant
was individually reviewed for discontinuities and/or gaps caused
by glottal fry using Praat [28]. Trials with glottal fry were excluded
from analysis, as were participants who 1) exhibited glottal fry on
more than 30% of baseline trials (.6 trials) or more than 20% of
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resulted in unplanned mismatches in feedback; or 3) had an F0
that was higher than the stimulus voice for one target word but
lower for the other. As a result of these exclusion criteria, 29 and
33 participants were included in the Early- and Late Mismatch
groups respectively.
The F0 data for each participant were then examined to
determine whether vocal production shifted up, or down, or not at
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the four stages of the experiment. See text for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018655.g001
Figure 2. The box plots for ratings on the two questions (Q1 and Q2) across five time points are shown for a small control group
(N=5).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018655.g002
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word, the mean and standard error of the last five trials of the
Baseline (excluding the first 5 trials of each word to allow the
participant to adapt to the microphone) were used to determine
the 95% confidence interval (CI). If the mean F0 of the 10 trials
immediately preceding the Mismatch stage fell within the baseline
95% CI, the participant was classified as ‘no shift’; if the F0 was
outside the 95% CI, the participant was classified as ‘up’ if it was
higher and ‘down’ if it was lower. In addition, for every trial after
the Baseline stage, for each participant, a normalized F0 shift
(relative to baseline) was calculated by subtracting the mean
baseline F0 for each word separately.
Results
a) Subjective ratings
In general, ratings were low across all time points for Q1 (i.e., ‘‘I
felt as if the voice I heard was my own voice’’), but high before and
low after the Mismatch stage for Q2 (i.e., ‘‘I felt as if the voice I
heard was a modified version of my own voice’’) (see Figure 3).
These observations were confirmed with MANOVAs on the
ratings on each of the two questions across the five time points,
with stimulus voice (V1 and V2) and group (Early Mismatch and
Late Mismatch) as between-subjects factors. For Q1, a pattern of
results consistent with the mismatch events having a marked effect
on ratings was rather weakly observed. There was a marginally
significant interaction between time and group F(4, 55) =2.52,
p=.052, gp
2=.16, with ratings being higher in the Early
Mismatch group than in the Late Mismatch group at both first
and last time points, p=.001 and p=.002, respectively. However,
ratings dropped significantly after the Mismatch only in the Early
Mismatch group, p=.004.
In addition, we observed a higher overall rating in the Early
Mismatch compared to the Late Mismatch group, F(1, 58) =8.56,
p=.005, gp
2=.13, and a marginally significant effect of time, F(4,
55) =2.47, p=.055, gp
2=.15. A trend analysis indicated that
there was a cubic trend of ratings across the time points, F(1, 58)
=8.04, p=.006, gp
2=.12, such that ratings decreased after the
first time point, and then started to gradually increase, before
decreasing again at the last time point.
Sign tests on Q1 ratings at each of the time points indicated that
for the Early Mismatch group, the ratings at the first and last time
points were not different from ‘neutral’ (i.e., a rating of ‘4’),
p $.061, but below ‘neutral’ at time points 2, 3, and 4, p#.008.
For the Last Mismatch group, the ratings were below ‘neutral’ at
all time points, p#.001.
The three-factor MANOVA on Q2 ratings revealed a strong
interaction between time and group F(4, 55) =25.26, p,.001,
gp
2=.65. Follow-up pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni
correction revealed that, for the Early Mismatch group, Q2
ratings at time point 1 (pre-Mismatch) were significantly higher
than those at all the later time points (post-Mismatch), p,.001. In
this group, Q2 rating at time point 2 was also lower than that at
time point 4, p=.003. For the Late Mismatch group, Q2 ratings at
the first four time points (pre-Mismatch) were all significantly
higher than that at the last time point (post-Mismatch), p,.001.
The ratings of the two groups did not differ at either the first or last
time point (i.e., before the mismatch event for both groups or after
it, p$.100) but the ratings from the Late Mismatch group were
significantly higher than those of the Early Mismatch group at
time points 2, 3, and 4, p#.001, which are pre-Mismatch stage for
the Late Mismatch group but post-Mismatch for the Early group
(see Figure 3b).
In addition to this expected interaction, participants who heard
V1 gave higher ratings that those who heard V2, F(1, 58) =5.63,
p=.021, gp
2=.09, and participants in the Late Mismatch group
gavehigher ratings than the Early Mismatch group, F(1, 58) =9.81,
p=.003, gp
2=.15. Finally, ratings varied across the time points,
F(4, 55) =34.39, p,.001, gp
2=.71. A trend analysis revealed a
combination of linear, F(1, 58) =33.43, p,.001, gp
2=.37, and
cubic, F(1, 58) =88.65, p,.001, gp
2=.60, components for ratings
across the time points, such that ratings dropped after the first time
point, and then slowly increased from time point 2 to 4, before
dropping again at the last time point.
Sign tests on Q2 ratings indicated that, for the Early Mismatch
group, Q2 ratings at the first time point (pre-Mismatch) were
reliably greater than ‘neutral’, p,.001, but ratings dropped to well
below ‘neutral’ at time point 2, p=.001 (post-Mismatch) and then
were not different from ‘neutral’ for time points 3, 4, and 5,
p$.458. For the Late Mismatch group, Q2 ratings at the four pre-
Mismatch time points were all reliably greater than ‘neutral’,
p#.001, whereas the rating at the post-Mismatch time point
dropped to well below ‘neutral’, p=.014.
The results, particularly from Q2, suggest that the Mismatch
stage, characterized by incongruent stimulus voice feedback,
appeared to disrupt the illusion of the stimulus voice being
attributed to the ‘self’, as evidenced by altered ratings. Higher Q2
ratings at the later time points for the Early Mismatch group (see
Figure 3b) may indicate that after many further trials of congruent
feedback, the illusory percept appeared to build again. Overall, it
seems that the perceptual illusion regarding the perceived identity
of the feedback voice is elicited by congruent feedback, matched in
timing and content to the participant’s own vocalization.
b) Vocal motor adaptation. To determine whether and how
participants altered production in response to the stimulus voice
feedback, we examined the F0 of participants’ vocal production
Figure 3. The box plots for ratings on the two questions (Q1 and Q2) are shown for the Early Mismatch and Late Mismatch group. a)
Question 1: I felt as if the voice I heard was my own voice, and b) Question 2: I felt as if the voice I heard was a modified version of my own voice,
were rated on a 7-point Likert scale across five time points. The Mismatch stage occurs after the first time point for the Early Mismatch group and
after the fourth time point for the Late Mismatch group, as indicated by a red vertical dashed line.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018655.g003
Table 1. The number of participants who shifted their F0 up
(Up), down (Down), or did not shift their F0 (No-shift) when
hearing either V1 or V2 are shown for ‘day’ and ‘too’.
day Up Down No-shift Follow CompensateNo-shift Total
V1 22 4 6 22 4 6 32
V2 16 6 8 17 5 8 30
too Up Down No-shift Follow CompensateNo-shift Total
V1 19 6 7 19 6 7 32
V2 13 9 8 16 6 8 30
Each participant was assessed based on whether the average F0 of 10 trials
immediately preceding the Mismatch stage was higher than (Up), lower than
(Down), or inside (No-shift) the range defined by the 95% CI for the mean
baseline F0 (see Procedure c for a more detailed description). For those
participants who significantly shifted their F0, the direction of the shift was also
determined as to whether the shift was towards (Follow) or away from
(Compensate) the stimulus voice heard.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018655.t001
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revealed that significantly more participants altered their F0 than
did not change when hearing either V1, x
2(1, N=32) $ 10.13,
p#.001, or V2, x
2(1, N=30) =6.53, p=.011. The direction of
change depended on the relation between the participant’s
baseline F0 and the stimulus voice F0, such that participants
were more likely to shift their F0 towards (i.e., ‘follow’), than away
from (i.e., ‘compensate’), that of the stimulus voice for both V1,
x
2(1, N=32) $ 6.76, p#.009, and V2, x
2(1, N=30) $ 4.55,
p#.033 (see Table 1). Thus participants tended to shift their F0
upward if their F0 was lower than that of the stimulus voice, and
downward if their F0 was higher (e.g., see Figure 4).
To understand the effect of the Mismatch stage on the pattern
of changes in F0, we compared the magnitude of normalized F0
shifts before and after the Stimulus Voice Mismatch stage for the two
groups. Here we used, for each word, the mean magnitudes of F0
shifts during the last 10 trials in the pre-Mismatch and the first 10
trials in the post-Mismatch stages as estimates of before and after F0
shifts respectively. We conducted a MANOVA with stage (before
and after) and word (‘day’ and ‘too’) as repeated measures, and
stimulus voice (V1 and V2) and group (Early Mismatch and Late
Mismatch) as between-subjects factors. We observed a higher
magnitude of F0 shifts in the after stage than in the before stage, F(1,
58) =8.00, p=.006, gp
2=.12. We also observed a three-way
interaction between stage, stimulus voice, and group, F(1, 58)
=6.34, p=.015, gp
2=.10. Post-hoc comparisons with Bonferroni
correction indicated that the magnitude of F0 shifts was the same
before and after the Mismatch stage for V1 in both groups, p$.288,
but greater after than before the Mismatch stage for V2, p#.042.
The observation that F0 shift was either unaltered or even greater
after the Mismatch stage, is in sharp contrast to the pattern of
subjective ratings. If production data mirrored the subjective
ratings, F0 shifts should have been diminished when the illusion
was broken.
In addition, the magnitude of F0 shift was higher in the Late
Mismatchgroup than inthe EarlyMismatch group,F(1,58) =4.43,
p=.040, gp
2=.07. There was also an interaction between group
and voice, F(1, 58) =4.32, p=.042, gp
2=.07, such that the
magnitude was higher in the Late Mismatch group only for V1,
p=.004.
Discussion
We believe that the emergence of this auditory illusion results
from the convergence of sensory cues in the context of voluntary
action. Previous studies have shown that motor action significantly
contributes to the self-recognition process by structuring the
perception of bodily multisensory signals [9], [10], [29]. The
coherence between motor movement and its sensory consequences
plays a critical role in modulating the perceptual experience of
both body ownership and movement agency [7], [30]. In the
present study, auditory feedback was temporally and phonetically
congruent with motor and somatosensory feedback from the
articulators. The alignment between vocal motor movement and
Figure 4. The F0 (Hz) time course for ‘day’ from one representative participant is shown. This participant was from the Last Mismatch
group and assigned V1 as the stimulus voice. The solid purple vertical line at trial 20 indicates the end of the Baseline stage. The two solid red vertical
lines indicate the beginning and end of the Stimulus Voice Mismatch stage. The black dashed horizontal line indicates the F0 of the stimulus voice V1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018655.g004
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ally categorize a stranger’s voice as being from themselves,
suggesting that the coherent action-related cues are integrated into
a unified sense of voice ownership.
It has been suggested that the induction of ownership in the
rubber hand illusion depends critically on a top-down process of
evaluating the rubber hand against a pre-existing cognitive
representation of the body, based on whether the rubber hand is
a plausible substitute for the body part [31]. This explains why
using a piece of wood [31], a wooden hand [32], or even a rubber
hand covered with non-natural skin texture [33] either reduces or
abolishes the illusion, depending on the degree of implausibility.
Similarly, the stranger’s voice in our study, although gender-
matched to the participant’s own voice, was otherwise very
different, and may therefore have been perceived as a somewhat
implausible substitute. This may be why participants endorsed Q2
rather than Q1. The large variances in the Q1 ratings may reflect
variability in the degree of judged implausibility across individuals.
In addition to the subjective ratings indicating that participants
were experiencing illusory ownership of the feedback voice, a trial-
by-trial assessment of vocal production revealed that participants
shifted their F0 to follow that of the feedback voice. A line of
studies using online F0 shift paradigms have shown that, in
general, people compensate for a change of F0 in their auditory
feedback during vocal production, i.e., by shifting their production
in the direction opposite to the shifted feedback signal [17], [19],
[34]. Although the central mechanism underlying the direction of
vocal motor adaptation is not well understood, the shift must
reflect the operation of a sensorimotor control process involved in
regulation of ongoing speech production. That our participants
tended to follow, rather than compensate, might be due to a
number of factors. One factor might be related to the large
magnitude of effective ‘shift’ between participants’ own voice F0
and the stimulus voice F0, which is within the range over which
Burnett et al. [17] observed the greatest proportion of following
responses as a result of F0 perturbation.
The observation that F0 remains shifted despite a change in
perception of the feedback voice identity suggests a divergence
between conscious perception and sensorimotor control. This is
consistent with a two-level model of self-action recognition, which
posits that an automatic level of action control and a conscious
level involving the perception of action agency can be separated
[35]. Empirical studies involving online sensory perturbation
during motor movements have revealed both mismatch [36] and
temporal lags [37] between objective motor responses and
subjective awareness of the perturbation. Data supporting such a
divergence also comes from clinical studies of patients with visual
form agnosia who demonstrate striking precision of hand
movements towards a visual target that they fail to perceive
[38], and of patients with schizophrenia who are capable of
initiating an action but are impaired in attributing the action to its
correct source [39]. Our data further add to this literature in
demonstrating that the cognitive systems that process auditory
feedback for the differentiation between ‘self’ and ‘other’ and for
control of ongoing vocal production appear to be at least partially
dissociable.
In summary, our study provides a new framework to explore the
sense of ownership of voice by examining both perceptual
judgment of voice identity, and acoustics of vocal production, in
the same context. Our findings shed new light on how identity and
acoustic information of voice are processed during talking, and are
relevant to the understanding of clinical conditions involving
impaired voice ownership attribution such as schizophrenia.
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